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On December 25, 2009 the Beijing Municipal No. 1 Inter-
mediate People’s Court, after a closed trial1, issued a guilty 
verdict and eleven-year sentence to Mr. Liu Xiaobo2, a Chinese 
scholar, for the crime of “inciting subversion of state power.”3
                                                 
∗ Attorney at Gibbs Houston Pauw. B.A. Nanjing University; J.D. Seattle 
University; LL.M. American University. The author would like to thank Pro-
fessor Sir Nicholas Kittrie for his seminar that led to this article, and the 
Pace International Law Review staff for their assistance in editing. The au-
thor dedicates this article to all the political prisoners in China. 
  
1 See Andrew Jacobs, Trial in China Signals Attack on Dissidents, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/20-
09/12/24/world/asia/24china.html. 
2 Mr. Liu Xiaobo was recently awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize on 
October 8, 2010. See The Nobel Peace Prize, http://nobel-
prize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2010/announcement.html (last visited 
Nov. 29, 2010). 
3 Case Update: International Community Speaks Out on Liu Xiaobo Ver-
dict, Human Rights In China (Dec. 30, 2009),  http://www.hrichina.org/pub-
lic/contents/press?revision%5fid=173860&item%5fid=172713 [hereinafter The 
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The conviction arose from a manifesto called “Charter 08,” 
which promotes a series of political reforms in China.4  Mr. Liu, 
who previously wrote numerous articles criticizing the political 
system and other social issues in China, was one of the main 
drafters of this manifesto.  Despite the fact that none of his ar-
ticles or the underlying manifesto incites real violence against 
either the regime or any individual, the court, without any dis-
cussion of the legal merits other than citing the titles and brief 
quotes from Mr. Liu’s articles, found that his articles were 
“slander” and “incite others to overthrow [the] country’s state 
power and the socialist system.”5  Without engaging in any 
form of balancing test or analysis regarding the constitutional 
guarantees of freedom of speech, the court simply concluded, 
“Liu Xiaobo’s actions have obviously exceeded the freedom of 
speech category and constitute criminal offense.”6
The guilty verdict from the closed trial and the omission of 
sufficient legal analysis by the court should not come as a sur-
prise.  Mr. Liu, a famous veteran of the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square protest, stood almost no chance of acquittal as soon as 
the prosecutors pressed this latest charge against him
 
7 more 
than a year before his trial.  In this case, the Chinese court did 
exactly what the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has always 
expected it to do: quash dissenting voices swiftly with or with-
out legal analysis.  The Chinese court also, as expected, faith-
fully played the role of guardian of the “socialist system,” a 
highly abstract term that is a top priority under the Chinese 
Constitution.8
                                                                                                             
Verdict]. 
 
4 Charter 08, Open Letter from Yu Haocheng et. al., Human Rights in 
China (Dec. 9, 2008) translation available at http://www.hri-
china.org/public/contents/press?revision%5fid=173861&item%5fid=85717. 
5 The Verdict, supra note 3. 
6 Id. (emphasis added). 
7 Liu was previously sentenced to two years in prison and three years of 
“reeducation through labor” for his writings. See Pen American Center, Chi-
na: Liu Xiaobo,  http://www.pen.org/viewmedia.php/prmMID/3029/prmID/172 
(last visited Nov. 29, 2010). 
8 XIAN FA [CONSTITUTION] art. 1 (1982) (China), available at 
http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/05/content_20813.htm (“The socialist system is 
the basic system of the People's Republic of China. Disruption of the socialist 
system by any organization or individual is prohibited.”). 
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Mr. Liu’s actual fate might be the same as thousands of 
dissidents before him.  His case, however, differs from the ma-
jority of the old generation of political charges in at least two 
aspects.  First, the statute under which he was convicted is 
found under the chapter “Crimes Endangering National Secu-
rity,” a newly enacted chapter with facially politically-neutral 
crimes rather than the old “Counterrevolution Crimes”.9
This article explores the Chinese government’s arsenal for 
persecution of political dissenters.  It also explores the subse-
quent detrimental effect it has had on the stability of Chinese 
society as well as the causal link between the hard line ap-
proach to dissent and the increasing social unrest. 
  
Second, his case is an example of the CCP’s increasing wari-
ness of public involvement in politically sensitive charges, 
which is a departure from the practice of openly accusing coun-
terrevolution offenders of decades ago, especially shortly after 
1989. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL OFFENSES IN CONTEMPORARY 
CHINA 
Unlike its European counterparts that have had long pe-
riods of liberalism toward political offenders10, China has 
shown almost no moment of such leniency toward offenders di-
rectly or indirectly challenging the ruling authority during its 
two thousand-year history.  The dozen major dynasties in Chi-
na’s history each lasted for an average of two centuries during 
which time uniformity and power concentration was always a 
commonly shared and essential feature of the dynasties.11
                                                 
9 See Human Rights in China & Human Rights Watch/Asia, China: 
Whose Security? “State Security” in China's New Criminal Code 2 (1997), 
available at http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/Reports/HRIC-Security.pdf.   
  Un-
10 NICHOLAS N. KITTRIE, REBELS WITH A CAUSE: THE MINDS AND MORALITY 
OF POLITICAL OFFENDERS 168 (Westview Press 2000). “Papadatos suggested 
that the new liberal attitudes toward political offenders were a product of the 
revolutions in the first half of the nineteenth centry. Since ‘[t]he parties in 
power had found themselves alternately conquerors and vanquished,’ Papa-
datos wrote, ‘political offenders seemed unlucky players rather than crimi-
nals.” Id. 
11 See ARTHUR COTTERELL & DAVID MORGAN, CHINA'S CIVILIZATION: A 
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like Europe, which had long been in a decentralized state after 
the fall of the Roman Empire and no ruler from any individual 
country had the administrative capacity to rule a substantial 
part, if not the whole, of Europe for an extensive period of time, 
each of China’s major dynasties throughout history controlled 
vast flatlands through which the emperor’s army could march 
unhindered.12
The king of France, for example, was considered only a duke in 
Brittany and had limited authority in that region for hundreds of 
years.  In practice if monarchs wanted to do anything - start a 
war, build a fort - they had to borrow and bargain for money and 
troops from local chieftains, who became earls, viscounts, and 
dukes in the process.
  During feudalism, European rulers did not pos-
sess absolute power because most of the landowning classes 
were independent.   
13
China ended this kind of decentralized feudalism as early 
as around 221 B.C., when the Qin Dynasty unified China after 
the Warring States Period.
   
14  A Chinese emperor became not 
only the ruler of every single person in his dominion, but also 
the owner of every inch of the land, and thus, an authority that 
bargained with no one.15
                                                                                                             
SURVEY OF ITS HISTORY, ARTS, AND TECHNOLOGY, at 309 (Praeger Publishers 
1975) (Outlining chronology of Chinese history with main dynasties); 
CHARLES O. HUCKER, CHINA'S IMPERIAL PAST: AN INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE 
HISTORY AND CULTURE 55 (Stanford Univ. Press 1975).  “The Chinese world 
should be united under a single Son of Heaven, and his control should be ef-
fectively centralized.” Id. 
  For long periods of time, the rulers of 
12 FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT 
HOME AND ABROAD 36-37 (1st ed. 2003). 
13 Id. at 37. 
14 COTTERELL & MORGAN, supra note 11, at 47. “By 221 B.C….[i]n place of 
the old feudal system of government belonging to the Classical Age a centra-
lized monarchy was established.” Id. 
15 CHARLES O. HUCKER, CHINA'S IMPERIAL PAST: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
CHINESE HISTORY AND CULTURE 56-57 (Stanford Univ. Press 1975). “The ruler 
was administrator, military leader, judge, manager of the economy, priest, 
educator, and moral exemplar.  His responsibility was total.  Accordingly, his 
authority had to be unlimited; and the Chinese polity came to be organized in 
such a way that the ruler’s authority was totalitarian in practice.” Id.; 
MICHAEL LOEWE, IMPERIAL CHINA 199 (Praeger Publishers 1965). “It was held, 
all arable land had been the property of the monarch.  The principle implies 
that land cannot be acquired by purchase, as ownership and the right of dis-
posal is vested solely in the sovereign.” Id. 
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European countries not only had to bargain with their own 
dukes but also had to tie, whether tightly or loosely, their legi-
timacy with the church.  A Chinese emperor, on the contrary, 
was a self-proclaimed “Son of Heaven,” whose legitimacy was 
as self-evident as the heaven itself.16
This historical background is certainly helpful in under-
standing the general psychology behind the persecution of po-
litical offenders in China.  As a ruler of a dynasty that had 
lasted for a century and was likely to last for many more, he 
(and very occasionally she) saw no need for leniency toward 
those who challenged or questioned the highest authority.  In 
other words, the “confidence level” of the ruling class was often 
so high that they did not think a “safety clause,” warranted any 
consideration, i.e. treating political offenders courteously today 
so that if the regime was ever overthrown, the rulers them-
selves would receive reciprocal leniency.
  One example demon-
strates this striking difference: King Henry VIII, in order to di-
vorce Catherine of Aragon and marry Anne Boleyn, had to an-
nul his marriage and later break away from the Catholic 
Church, at the cost of creating internal strife and external in-
vasion.  The Chinese emperors, however, never needed to seek 
confirmation from a religious institution nor foreign sovereign.  
17
Although modern China is no longer ruled by a feudal em-
peror, China is undoubtedly still a totalitarian regime.  The 
justification for the ruling party is no longer the “Son of Hea-
ven” argument, but rather a more carefully crafted “people’s 
representative” argument, i.e. the leading power is no longer a 
self-proclaimed godly figure, but rather a self-proclaimed class 
of protectors of the people’s interest.
  
18
                                                 
16 HUCKER, supra note 15, at 55. “The Chinese world should be united 
under a single Son of Heaven, and his control should be effectively centra-
lized.” Id. 
  Despite this difference, 
the current regime is not that different from the past ones.  It 
17 KITTRIE, supra note 10. 
18 PIERRE M. PERROLLE, FUNDAMENTALS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST 
PARTY 6 (International Arts And Sciences Press 1976). “The great leader 
Chairman Mao has also pointed out that ‘the Communist Party is a political 
party which works in the interest of the nation and people and which has ab-
solutely no private ends to pursue.’” Id. 
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still holds all the major bargaining chips and has no formidable 
bargaining opponent.  The regime owns every inch of land in 
China and what is on the real estate market are not land own-
ership rights, but only rights to lease land from the govern-
ment.19  The CCP has a monopoly in all aspects of politics and 
policy making.  There is no realistic check on government pow-
er, as the legitimacy of the ruling party is not decided by an 
outside source or any independent means, but is rather self-
evident simply because it is a “people’s party.”  Challenging the 
party, therefore, automatically means, at least on its face, chal-
lenging the people.  Unlike the political offenders in western 
Europe who, for a long period of time, had been viewed as noble 
offenders providing alternatives on how a society should be 
run, the offenders in China are pictured as sinister conspira-
tors who target nothing but the people.20  For example, in Mr. 
Liu’s guilty verdict, the court, though making no false factual 
allegation, used a limited, yet significantly colored term of art 
to portray the defendant as one who had a grudge against so-
ciety.  The court stated that Mr. Liu committed these crimes 
“due to his dissatisfaction with the political and socialist sys-
tem of our country’s people’s democratic dictatorship.”21
                                                 
19 See Xiaogang Deng, Lening Zhang & Andrea Leverentz, The Dual Sys-
tem of Land Use Policy and Its Related Problems in Contemporary China, in 
CHINA IN AN ERA OF TRANSITION: UNDERSTANDING CONTEMPORARY STATE AND 
SOCIETY ACTORS 79-84 (Reza Hasmath & Jennifer Hsu eds., Palgrave Macmil-
lan 2009).  
  This 
language, especially in the special context of the Chinese lan-
guage, shows that the court found nothing noble about this of-
fender, who instead of feeling lucky and satisfied with the great 
people’s society as any reasonable person would do, chose to 
poison the health of the society.  It is, therefore, reasonably fo-
reseeable that these kinds of “undeserving” offenders are not 
20 Theodore H.E. Chen, The Chinese Communist Regime: A Brief Review, 
in COMMUNIST CHINA 30 (Yung Wei ed., Charles E. Merrill Publishing Com-
pany 1972). “A campaign for the ‘suppression of counterrevolutionaries’ was 
launched in the latter part of 1950, and the ensuring months saw a crescendo 
of mass trials, mass executions, and wholesale persecution of all who were 
believed or suspected to be hostile to the new regime … These campaigns 
against the ‘enemies of the people’ left no doubt among the people that the 
Communist would brook no interference with what they were setting out to 
do.” Id. 
21 The Verdict, supra note 3 (emphasis added). 
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likely to get the leniency in China that their counterparts in 
Europe receive. 
Portraying itself as the eternal representative of the people 
is the foundational tradition of the China’s ruling party.  The 
party’s ruling philosophy and policy priorities are often reflect-
ed in the form of policy directives from the President, who is al-
so the chairman of the party.  In 2006, the current President, 
faced with a booming Chinese economy with the type of mo-
mentum challenging the top players in the international com-
munity, called “for the creation of a ‘harmonious society.’”22
To its credit, China has moved away from wanton persecu-
  A 
term this vague needs interpretation, a large part of which has 
been accomplished through the actual treatment of dissidents.  
This call for a more harmonious and stable society has turned 
out to be an effective “preemptive strike” against dissidents.  
Rather than creating a society in which people can harmo-
niously and freely express their views publicly, this directive in 
fact encourages silencing dissidents and, therefore, creates a 
debate-free realm.  The directive also goes a step further by ex-
plaining why the dissidents are enemies and how they can 
create harm by destabilizing the society, even though the vast 
majority of the speculated harm is really debatable.  Addition-
ally, this directive also indicates that the government should 
not only focus on the dissenting mind, but also dissenting con-
duct.  The government is no longer interested in interfering in 
citizens’ private lives and digging out their dissenting thoughts 
or attitudes.  It now focuses on capturing actions and labeling 
them as real threats to society.  When faced with the half-a-
century-old international criticism of its persecution of dissi-
dents, it is now easier for the Chinese government to fire back 
with the simple argument that the defendants are not simply 
political dissidents who targeted the heads of the regime, but 
rather criminals whose actions could have caused real harm to 
society. 
                                                 
22 See Maureen Fan, China’s Party Leadership Declares New Priority: 
“Harmonious Society”, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2006, at A18, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/11/AR20061-
01101610.html. 
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tion of people merely based on their social status or family 
background, as was the practice before and during the Cultural 
Revolution.23  When a booming economy not only strengthens, 
but also arguably legitimizes the rule of party leadership, per-
secuting random citizens merely for “leading a capitalistic life-
style” is clearly out of date, unnecessary, and perceived harm-
ful to the regime itself.  China has also emerged as one of the 
key players on the international stage, and as a result, the re-
gime has tried to keep up with various international standards 
at least at the de jure level. For example, it has signed, though 
not yet completely ratified, many international conventions re-
garding civil, human, and refugee rights.24  The persecutions of 
political offenders in China, however, have never ceased even 
with the world’s acceptance of China.  Although in recent dec-
ades, open trials against the “anti-revolution culprits” have 
been a very rare event, persecution of political offenders has 
instead evolved into closed trials with non-ideologically-related 
charges.  The open involvement of the party in these persecu-
tions has been reduced and replaced with the judiciary utilizing 
ambiguous and overly broad statutes.25
                                                 
23 BAOGANG GUO AND SUJIAN GUO, CHINA IN SEARCH OF A HARMONIOUS 
SOCIETY: Challenges Facing Chinese Political Development 3 (Lexington 
Books 2008). “The emphasis on social harmony and stability represents a 
break away from the era of political campaign and class struggle and transi-
tion from a revolutionary party to a governing party.” Id. 
  During the ancient 
dynasties, open execution and even public torture of dissidents 
served as a deterrence and maintained the status quo.  During 
modern times, the ruling party, for the purpose of efficiency 
and apparent civility as well as its lack of confidence in ideolo-
gy monopoly, has only been interested in finding a convenient 
and civil way, not necessarily the most brutal way, to silence 
dissenting voices.  The government now puts its trust in the 
judiciary, a branch that has a very limited degree of indepen-
dence especially in political cases, in order to maintain status 
quo by having it utilize China’s questionable Constitution and 
24 See Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Core United Na-
tions Documents Signed, Ratified, or Acceded to by China, 
http://cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/inthrol/index.php. 
25 See Human Rights in China & Human Rights Watch/Asia, China: 
Whose Security? “State Security” in China's New Criminal Code 2 (1997), 
available at http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/Reports/HRIC-Security.pdf.   
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the series of “National Security Laws.”  The CCP expects the 
“harmonious society” directive to deliver satisfactory results in 
sensitive cases not for an ideological battle, but for maintaining 
the status quo.  The result, as shown in Mr. Liu’s case, has 
lived up to the CCP’s expectations so far. 
III. THE MODERN TOOLS OF POLITICAL PERSECUTION 
A. The Chinese Constitution 
The mere fact that a regime has a Constitution does not 
automatically guarantee that the rights and privileges found in 
that document can be effectively protected in real life.  In many 
totalitarian regimes, a document with the title “The Constitu-
tion” serves more of a propaganda function rather than divid-
ing and limiting powers at a substantive level.  This type of 
“Stalin Constitution” guarantees the permanent dominance of 
the drafters, oftentimes the regime itself, rather than guaran-
teeing a peaceful and orderly change of administration.26
The concept of the Constitution, recognized by liberal dem-
ocratic countries as a power limiting “social contract,” has nev-
er been widely accepted under China’s regime.  Also, the con-
cept of “rule of law” in China differs from that in most 
constitutional democracies.  As Jerome Cohen pointed out in 
one of his speeches, “the simplest and best [definition for the 
term ‘rule of law’] is ‘government under law.’”
  The 
true value of the Constitution should be seriously questioned 
when the constitutionality of the government’s policies is never 
formally questioned as well as when legislation, having lan-
guage and effects that clearly contradict stated principles and 
provisions in the Constitution, is never struck down as uncons-
titutional. 
27
                                                 
26 WILLIAM C. KIRBY, The Chinese Party-State Under Dictatorship and 
Democracy on the Mainland and on Taiwan, in REALMS OF FREEDOM IN 
MODERN CHINA 113, 117 (William C. Kirby ed., 2004) (quoting Joseph Stalin, 
“if there is no constitution . . . enemies can charge that you have seized power 
by force.  They could say that the government was imposed on the people . . . 
you should take this weapon away from your enemies.”). Id. 
  However, the 
27 UCtelevision, Jerome Cohen: Is There Law in China? Is There Justice?, 
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term “rule of law” in China often relates to the legalist view of 
how society should function with laws provided by the rulers.28
civil rights
  
The laws are designed to make citizens behave and act how the 
regime wants them to.  Under this view of the “law,” the pri-
vate individual has no legitimate  and personal free-
dom must not in any way challenge the ruler’s reign.  In this 
case, the ruler is the CCP.  Under this view, all laws are essen-
tially directives from above that maintain social order for the 
ruler.  The entity that gives these directives, in the form of 
laws, is not bound by any form of “social contract” that would 
limit the laws and policies the regime could legally enact.  The 
CCP, therefore, need neither comply with the “law” nor the 
Constitution. 
The Chinese Constitution is a product of a regime that is 
unwilling to limit its powers and subject itself to checks and 
balances.  The Preamble summarizes the “great victory” led by 
the CCP and Article 1 under the First Chapter describes that 
the Constitution is essentially a tool that unconditionally af-
firms and legitimizes the ruling party’s political power.29
[t]he People’s Republic of China is a socialist state under the 
people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class and 
based on the alliance of workers and peasants.  The socialist sys-
tem is the basic system of the People’s Republic of China.  Dis-
ruption of the socialist system by any organization or individual 
is prohibited.
  Ar-
ticle 1 states:  
30
This clause achieves two important goals.  First, it covertly 
identifies the CCP as the sole leading political entity of the na-
tion.  Also, its position is not subject to challenge provided this 
   
                                                                                                             
YOUTUBE (Apr. 24, 2008), 22:34, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G1JG4-
jpY42o. 
28 JAMES M. ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW DESKBOOK: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR 
FOREIGN-INVESTED ENTERPRISES 40 (American Bar Association 3d ed. 2010). 
“Overall, the Rule of Law (fazhi) in ancient China is characterized as a Rule 
of Man (renzhi); the law was designed for the benefit of those governing, ra-
ther than as an instrument of divine sanction or supreme authority.  To the 
legalist, the ruler was above the law.” Id. 
29 XIAN FA [CONSTITUTION] Preamble (1982) (China), available at 
http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/05/content_20813.htm. 
30 XIAN FA [CONSTITUTION] art. 1 (1982) (China), available at 
http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/05/content_20813.htm. 
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version of the Constitution is valid.  Since the CCP is the only 
political party in China that claims to be the sole representa-
tive of the working class, and no other political party, either le-
gally or illegally formed, has the ability or the legitimacy to 
challenge its position, the CCP can simply point to Article 1 of 
the Constitution, which was drafted under the supervision of 
the CCP, and prove its own legitimacy.  It is, of course, a circu-
lar argument for a self-proclaimed power.  However, even 
pointing out the fallacy of this circular argument can potential-
ly be a violation of the Constitution because the second func-
tion of this article effectively prohibits such doubt, which can 
arguably constitute “disruption of the socialist system.”  This 
second function limits the remaining constitutional provisions 
as well as all laws and regulations.   
The conceptual vagueness of “disruption of the socialist 
system” makes it impossible to challenge any decision made by 
the CCP.  What constitutes “disruption of the socialist system” 
is difficult to determine.  First, there is the issue of what quali-
fies as a “disruption” under the Constitution.  For example, 
does a “disruption” include a law or activity that has realistic 
likelihood of interfering with the system or would it encompass 
any form of disagreement with the system, however ineffective 
the disruption is in toppling the system?  Second, what really 
constitutes a “socialist system” is a myth.  It should not come 
as a surprise that party leaders, scholars, and common citizens 
might have very different interpretations of “socialism” and 
may disagree as to whether the country is still on the “socialist 
path.”  However, the final say lies exclusively in the hands of 
the CCP.  It virtually puts itself above the People’s Congress, 
the legislative body that is supposed to make no law that ever 
“disrupts the socialist system.” 
The first article of the Chinese Constitution renders all of 
the other rights below it de jure limited rights.  In contrast, 
constitutional rights in other countries appear unqualified 
throughout their constitutions.  Even the unqualified rights in 
other constitutions are still subject to some kind of “balancing 
test” from time to time.  However, the more obvious the restric-
tive language and the more powerful the underlying restric-
12 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol. 2:4 
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tion, the less basic the rights become.  The very fact that some 
constitutions choose to leave their basic rights unqualified, at 
least textually, is probably due to the fear that any written and 
settled restriction within the constitutions might render these 
rights less fundamental.  However, the basic line of logic of the 
Chinese Constitution, as reflected by the Preamble and Article 
1, is that all rights are at least subject to the scrutiny of the 
survival of the “socialist system.”  Once there is a conflict, the 
socialist system must triumph.  It is also important to note that 
this Constitution probably never contemplates any conflict re-
garding this issue among the Government, People’s Congress, 
and the Court.  The language is in fact directed against indi-
vidual citizens and other organizations.31  Due to the CCP’s po-
sition at the top of the hierarchy of power, the political 
branches in China have maintained almost perfect harmony 
when it comes to politically sensitive cases.  The People’s Con-
gress has never passed legislation that has later been found 
“anti-socialist.”  The Court never engages in any analysis of the 
constitutionality of enacted laws and has instead always faith-
fully applied them, especially in politically sensitive cases.  
Even where it should constitute judicial misconduct to reduce 
the legal analysis regarding freedom of speech issues to some-
thing as brief as “[the] actions have obviously exceeded the 
freedom of speech category,”32
The following case from Singapore involving the constitu-
tional guarantee of freedom of speech, serves as an example of 
how some explicitly restrictive language in a constitution can 
reduce an arguably basic right to one that is at the mercy of 
lawmakers. 
 the Court has always refrained 
from providing meaningful guidelines in many constitutional 
cases.  This reluctance in meaningful adjudication in political 
cases makes the Court’s decisions unclear to the readers.   
Article 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore 
guarantees its citizens freedom of speech.  Section 1(a) of Ar-
ticle 14 provides that “every citizen of Singapore has the right 
                                                 
31 See id. (“Disruption of the socialist system by any organization or indi-
vidual is prohibited.”) (emphasis added). 
32 The Verdict, supra note 3 (emphasis added). 
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to freedom of speech and expression.”33
Parliament may by law impose . . . on the rights conferred by 
clause (1)(a), such restrictions as it considers necessary or expe-
dient in the interest of the security of Singapore or any part the-
reof, friendly relations with other countries, public order or mo-
rality and restrictions designed to protect the privileges of 
Parliament or to provide against contempt of court, defamation 
or incitement to any offence.
  This freedom, however, 
is explicitly limited by Section 2 of Article 14, which states 
that:  
34
This constitutional provision is very different from one in 
which the freedom of speech provision is unqualified, for exam-
ple, as in the US Constitution.  Likewise, in the Chinese Con-
stitution, there is no textual limitation immediately relating to 
the clause regarding freedom of speech.
  
35
In Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew, a foun-
dational freedom of expression case, the Court of Appeal of 
Singapore explains the relationship between a right in the 
Constitution and the possibility of it being limited or even re-
pealed.
  However, Article 1’s 
“disruption of socialist system” language explicitly limits all 
rights.  Therefore, when it comes to restricting some rights in 
the Constitution, China’s “covert” restriction in fact functions 
very similarly to Singapore’s “overt” restrictions. 
36
                                                 
33 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE, art. 14, § 1(a) available 
at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/non_version/cgi-bin/cgi_retrieve.pl?&actno=Rev-
ed-CONST&date=latest&method=part. 
  Jeyaretnam involves the suicide of Teh, an official of 
the People’s Action Party.  The People’s Action Party was the 
party in power at the time of the litigation.  Shortly before his 
suicide, Teh was publicly under investigation for corruption 
charges.  Following the news of Teh’s suicide, Jeyaretnam, 
leader of the Worker’s Party and appellant in this case, made a 
34 Id. art. 14, § 2(a). 
35 See XIAN FA art. 35 (1982) (China), available at http://eng-
lish.gov.cn/2005-08/05/content_20813.htm  “Citizens of the People’s Republic 
of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of 
procession and of demonstration.” Id art. 1. 
36 See Benjamin v. Yew, [1992] 2 SLR 310 (Court of Appeal) available at 
http://www.singaporelaw.sg/rss/judg/9713.html. 
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public speech in front of his political supporters.  Jeyaretnam 
questioned why the government had not conducted an inquiry 
into how Mr. Teh obtained the unusual poison he had used to 
commit suicide.  Furthermore, Jeyaretnam wanted to know 
how the Prime Minister, the respondent in this case, had re-
sponded to Teh’s letter to him one day prior to the suicide in 
which Teh had written “I will do as you advise.”37  The respon-
dent sued for defamation alleging that the appellant’s speeches 
“‘were understood to mean that the plaintiff was guilty of dis-
honourable and/or criminal conduct.’”38  In his appeal, the ap-
pellant cited “constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of 
speech in other jurisdictions, such as Canada, India and the 
United States,” and relied heavily on the decision of New York 
Times v. Sullivan.39
the speech made … was a publication concerning the official con-
duct of the respondent as Prime Minister or the performance of 
his duties as such; that the appellant had a legitimate interest in 
the subject matter of his speech, and that the publication was 
made to those having a corresponding and legitimate interest, 
and hence the occasion in which the publication was made was 
privileged.
  He argued that:  
40
After reviewing New York Times v. Sullivan and the other for-
eign cases cited by the appellant, the court held that it was 
“unable to follow” those decisions.
   
41  The court reviewed the 
First Amendment of the US Constitution and found that “[n]o 
such express prohibition [which prohibits Congress from mak-
ing any laws ‘abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press’ 
exists] in art 14 of our [the Singapore] Constitution.42
first, such restrictions as it considers necessary and expedient in 
  The 
court found that Section 2 of Article 14 of the Singapore Consti-
tution explicitly placed two categories of restrictions upon free-
dom of speech:  
                                                 
37 Id. para. 11. 
38 Id. para. 13. 
39 Id. para. 43. 
40 Id. para. 44. 
41 Id. para. 56. 
42 Benjamin v. Yew, [1992] 2 SLR 310, para. 56 (Court of Appeal), avail-
able at http://www.singaporelaw.sg/rss/judg/9713.html. 
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the interest of the security of Singapore or any part thereof, 
friendly relations with other countries, public order or morality; 
and second, restrictions designed to protect the privileges of Par-
liament or to provide against contempt of court, defamation or in-
citement to any offence.43
The court held that, in the context of defamation, freedom of 
speech is completely at the mercy of the Parliament:  
  
[w]hile the first category of restrictions must satisfy the test of 
necessity and expediency in the interest of the various matters 
specified therein, the second category of restrictions is not re-
quired to satisfy any such test.  Thus, Parliament is empowered 
to make laws to impose on the right of free speech restriction de-
signed to provide against defamation.44
The court further pointed out that the limitation provision in 
Section 2 of Article 14 is broad.
 
45  Comparing Article 14 with 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
court noted that the Singapore limitation provision does not in-
clude the requirement “necessary in a democratic society” as is 
found in Article 10.46
In this case, the Singapore court essentially approved a 
quick two-part analysis. First, it must be determined whether 
the Constitution allows Parliament to enact the statute that 
convicted the defendant, and if so, then it must be determined 
whether the defendant is guilty under this statute.  As for the 
issue of whether the right to freedom of speech can be repealed 
by Parliament, it requires no discussion in the Singapore court 
because the answer is obvious: the Constitution explicitly an-
swers this question in the affirmative.  Freedom of speech in 
Singapore is not a right that requires extensive tests and scru-
tiny of those laws that restrict it.  This Constitution renders 
such a right no more different than the legal freeway speed 
limit, both can be easily regulated by legislation.  In this sense, 
the Singapore court did exactly what the Constitution requires 
it to do by upholding Parliament’s law and refusing to weigh it 
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against any “constitutional right.” 
Likewise, when the Chinese court charges a defendant for 
violating a statute that supposedly has the purpose of protect-
ing the socialist ideology, the government, or both, the court 
will most likely deem it irrelevant to consider whether such a 
statute is unconstitutional because the Constitution has a clear 
position on socialism.  It is logical for the court to uphold a sta-
tute that promotes and preserves the CCP’s interest, i.e. the 
socialist system because that is what the Constitution man-
dates.  In this aspect, the Chinese court, like the Singapore 
court, is indeed closely following the Constitution. 
B. The Court’s Lack of Independence 
Not all express limitations on constitutional rights in the 
constitutions render them easy and effective tools to silence 
dissent.  It greatly depends on what the limitation is and who 
is deciding the issue.  The latter involves the issue of judicial 
independence.  A limitation clause can be broadly drafted in 
the Constitution yet, if the judiciary has the power to indepen-
dently hold that there is no nexus between the defendant’s ac-
tion and the limitation clause, many forms of political dissent 
may be permissible. 
For example, Germany’s Basic Law has an express limita-
tion clause regarding freedom of expression.  It states that 
“[t]hese rights shall find their limits in the provisions of gener-
al laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons, and 
in the right to personal honour.”47
                                                 
47 GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] 
[GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. V(2) (Ger.), available at 
https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf. 
  What constitutes “personal 
honor” is vague and largely undefined.  A good faith criticism of 
a person’s conduct could arguably be viewed as an attack on 
personal honor if the criticism was somehow humiliating.  This 
limitation clause has the potential of creating an enormous 
chilling effect on expressions that convey any negativity about 
an individual.  The German Federal Constitutional Court, 
however, did not allow this broad language in its Basic Law to 
turn into a catch-all restriction.  It has held that “[t]he basic 
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right to freedom of expression, the most immediate aspect of 
the human personality in society, is one of the most precious 
rights of man,”48
general laws which have the effect of limiting a basic right must 
be read in the light of its significance and always be construed so 
as to preserve the special value of this right, with, in a free de-
mocracy, a presumption in favour of freedom of speech in all 
areas, and especially in public life.
 and thus  
49
Had the German court been controlled or heavily influenced by 
a government that sees political disagreement as a form of 
“dishonor” or “disruption,” the holding, which put a high value 
on the right to freedom of expression concerning public mat-
ters, most likely would have been different. 
   
Ideally, a higher degree of independence of the Chinese 
courts may still be able to cure the restrictive attitude toward 
dissent created by Article 1 of the Constitution.  Arguably, even 
if the socialist system must be protected, many actions may not 
rise to the level of “disruption.”  In Mr. Liu’s case, for example, 
although he wrote many articles critical of the government, all 
of his articles are banned from publication within China, cen-
sored on the Internet and, therefore, their circulation within 
China were limited to only a small group of dissidents.50  In his 
statement of defense, Mr. Liu argued that “[his] articles do not 
contain any language inciting violence, nor can they realistical-
ly incite violence because [he] published those articles on for-
eign websites that cannot be accessed from China without us-
ing any bypassing technology.”51
                                                 
48 Bundesverfassungsgericht BVERFGE [Federal Constitutional Court] 
Jan. 15, 1958, 7 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 
[BVERFGE] 198 (Ger.), translated in Foreign Law Translations, INST. FOR 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW, http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/trans-
national/work_new/german/case.php?id=1477. 
  Mr. Liu also pointed out that 
“his articles and ‘Charter 08’ contain no content of ‘defamation 
49 Id. 
50 Liu Xiaobo An Yishen Bianhu Ci, (刘晓波案一审辩护词) [Statement of 
the Defendant in the First Trial of Liu Xiaobo], DEUTSCHE WELLE (Jan. 4, 
2010) [hereinafter Statement of the Defendant] http://www.dw-world.de/-
dw/article/0,,5075054,00.html. 
51 Id. 
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or libel,’ . . .  because they reflect Mr. Liu’s own personal politi-
cal opinions, which are his personal ‘value judgment,’ rather 
than ‘statements of facts.’”52  The court, however, not only ig-
nored and refused to address these legitimate defenses, but al-
so set up unreasonable procedural obstacles for the defendant.  
During the oral argument, instead of allotting an equal amount 
of time for each side, the Chief Judge stated that the defen-
dant’s time should not exceed the prosecutor’s time, however 
long the latter might be.53  As was pointed out by the defense 
attorney, this arbitrary rule created the bizarre possibility that 
“the defendant might only have a few seconds for his oral ar-
gument if the prosecutor simply stated ‘we respectfully request 
this Court to give harsh punishment to the defendant,’ a 
statement of which would only last no more than a few 
seconds.”54  During the defendant’s statement in oral argu-
ment, the Chief Judge also interrupted Mr. Liu as he men-
tioned that “his life journey made a turn in June 1989.”55  The 
Chief Judge stated, “please do not elaborate on the ‘6.4 Inci-
dent.’”56
The Chinese court’s lack of independence from political in-
fluence is a result of the Chinese Constitution’s design.  As 
Stephanie Balme has pointed out, on the issue of judicial inde-
pendence, “the … Constitution is essentially contradictory.  On 
the one hand, it declares and ensures the supremacy of the rul-
ing party.  On the other hand, it proclaims that ‘judicial power 
should be exercised independently.’”
  Public discussion of the “6.4 Incident,” or what is more 
commonly known as the “Tiananmen Massacre,” is taboo in 
China.  However, the court’s quick self-censorship over this is-
sue during a closed trial while the defendant was merely men-
tioning a date rather than expanding on any of the substantive 
events that occurred during that incident, indicates the court’s 
low degree of independence from the CCP’s political influence. 
57
                                                 
52 Id. 




56 Statement of the Defendant, supra note 50. 
57 Stéphanie Balme, Local Courts in Western China: The Quest for Inde-
pendence and Dignity, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA 154, 161 (Randall 
Peerenboom ed., 2010). 
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it seem that the Constitution does promote judicial indepen-
dence.  However, putting it in the context of the CCP’s power 
monopoly, and the fact that, as was also pointed out by Ms. 
Balme, Article 128 of the Constitution states “[l]ocal people’s 
courts at different levels are responsible to the organs of state 
power which created them,”58 as well as the important fact that 
“the vast majority of [the Chinese judges] are party mem-
bers,”59
The Constitution’s text does not explicitly prohibit the CCP 
from influencing the court.  In Article 5, the Constitution lists 
“all political parties” in parallel with “all state organs, the 
armed forces, … public organizations, and all enterprises and 
institutions” when it comes to abiding the Constitution.
 it is reasonable to argue that this requirement for “in-
dependently exercising judicial power,” merely requires the ap-
pearance of independence, especially in politically sensitive 
cases.  Decisions are sufficiently “independent” as long as the 
verdicts come from the court and are signed by the judges.  
This is regardless of the fact that the judges may have had con-
fidential communications with party leaders or the fact that 
many judges, as party members themselves, have been actively 
self-censoring their rulings, as was shown in Mr. Liu’s case.   
60  In 
Article 126, the clause that establishes judicial independence, 
the Constitution only states that the judiciary is not subject to 
interference by “any administrative organ, public organization 
or individual,”61
                                                 
58 XIAN FA [CONSTITUTION] art. 128 (1982) (China), available at 
http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/05/content_20813.htm. 
 leaving out “political parties.”  The reality is 
consistent with this textual design: the court not only aligns it-
self with the party in politically sensitive cases, but is also very 
explicit and often outspoken about the judiciary’s duty to follow 
the party.  Several past and current Chief Justices of the Su-
preme People’s Court have announced or written articles pledg-
ing allegiance to the CCP.  The current Chief Justice, Wang 
Shengjun, in his recent article published in Qiushi, a journal of 
59 Id. at 164. 
60 XIAN FA art. 5 (1982) (China), available at http://english.gov.cn/2005-
08/05/content_20813.htm. 
61 Id. art. 126. 
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the Central Committee of the CCP, argued that whether the 
judiciary can play a larger role in maintaining social order di-
rectly affects the “[Communist] Party’s ruling position.”62
[t]he People’s Court must firmly support the Party’s leadership, 
and push forward its work … , with the Party and the country’s 
overall interest at the center; it must timely report its work to 
the Party, and closely use the leadership of the Party to face dif-
ficulties and problems in its work.
  He 
concluded his article with an unequivocal statement about the 
judiciary’s position under the CCP,  
63
C. The “National Security Laws” 
   
In China, the days have passed when political offenders 
were forcibly marched to the streets and publicly denounced 
and ridiculed, as these “struggle sessions” do not fit China’s 
new international image.  Political offenders are also no longer 
confronted with the minute details as to how their political 
views go against communist or socialist doctrines and why they 
should, therefore, wholeheartedly embrace the chance of reedu-
cation.  Economic growth is becoming the main, if not the only 
priority.  Social stability and continuing the monopoly of power 
are major directives of the CCP.64  For these reasons, quick and 
quiet disposal of political dissidents, rather than belabored 
open ideological battles with them, is preferred by the ruling 
party.  In 1997, the year when the United Kingdom returned 
Hong Kong to China, “counterrevolution crimes” started to dis-
appear from the Criminal Code and were replaced with a series 
of laws criminalizing acts that threaten national security.65
                                                 
62 Shengjun Wang, Push Forward the Three Key Tasks to Achieve New 




64 GUO & GUO, supra note 23, at 3. “The emphasis on social harmony and 
stability represents a break away from the era of political campaign and class 
struggle and transition from a revolutionary party to a governing party.  In 
this sense, the party is increasingly interested in enhancing its governing ca-
pacity and in search of new sources of political legitimacy.” Id. 
65 See Human Rights in China & Human Rights Watch/Asia, China: 
Whose Security? “State Security” in China's New Criminal Code 2 (1997), 
available at http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/Reports/HRIC-Security.pdf.   
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This is a further step toward “depoliticizing” political persecu-
tions. 
Mr. Liu was convicted under Article 105 Section 2 of the 
Chinese Criminal Code.66  This statute criminalizes spreading 
rumors, slander, or other acts that incite to subvert the power 
of the state or overthrow the socialist system.67
There have been several recent cases similar in nature 
where the defendants, many of them human rights activists, 
have been convicted merely for their writings criticizing the 
Chinese Government.  In 2008, Hu Jia was convicted under 
“inciting subversion of state power and the socialist system” for 
his open letters and articles criticizing the Government’s hu-
man rights record before the Beijing Olympics.
  The new law’s 
language is so broad that it can effectively cover offenses both 
with and without specific anti-regime intent.  In many cases, a 
petition or an appeal for reform, however peaceful the method 
or sincere the language is, can be held as a form of “subver-
sion”.  Mr. Liu’s case is one such example.   
68  In February 
2010, Tan Zuoren, an activist seeking to document shoddy con-
structions that contributed to deaths during the 2008 earth-
quake, was convicted for inciting subversion in his emailed 
comments about the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre.69  In July 
2010, Gheyret Niyaz, a Uyghur journalist, was convicted of en-
dangering state security as a result of his speaking to foreign 
journalists.70  This list could go on and Liu Xianbin, who was 
recently arrested for inciting subversion,71
                                                 
66 See The Verdict, supra note 3. 
 is likely to be added 
67 Xingfa (刑法) [Criminal Code] (promulgated by Order No. 83 of the 
President of the People’s Republic of China, Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 
1997) art. 105 (China), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/english-
npc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384075.htm. 
68 Profile: Chinese Dissent Hu Jia, BBC NEWS, (Dec. 17, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7662238.stm. 
69 Lucy Hornby, China quake activist jailed for inciting subversion, 
REUTERS (Feb. 9, 2010), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/-
idUSTRE6180QA20100209. 
70 Emma Graham-Harrison, China jails Uighur journalist for 15 Years: 
Employer, REUTERS, July 23, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/-
article/idUSTRE66M1PF20100723. 
71 See Press Release, Human Rights in China, Case Update: Dissident 
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to this list.  
While the old “counterrevolution crimes” aimed at main-
taining an ideological monopoly, the new “Endangering Na-
tional Security” laws aim at maintaining the current status quo 
and the party’s power monopoly regardless of whether the cur-
rent leadership is still faithful to “socialism” and “the commun-
ist revolution.”  With this new “subversion of state power” lan-
guage added into the Criminal Code, any challenge against the 
leading authority, whether it be anti-socialist or pro-socialist in 
nature, can easily be dismissed as a violation of law.  A true be-
liever in communism can easily be found guilty under this law 
as long as he publicly questions the party’s policies including 
the market economy and the extension of party membership 
eligibility to the business class.  Interestingly and to some de-
gree expectedly, in Mr. Liu’s case, the Court showed no interest 
in addressing his argument where he compared his writings 
with the political statements made by past high-ranking CCP 
leaders.  When put into historical and contemporary contexts, 
these statements look as incriminating, if not more so, for the 
purpose of subversion.72
                                                                                                             
Liu Xianbin Arrested on Suspicion of Inciting Subversion of State Power (Ju-
ly 6, 2010), available at http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/press?rev-
ision_id=175028&item_id=175026. 
  It is fair to say that the statute is 
practically so effective in convicting dissidents that being 
charged under this statute is almost in itself evidence sufficient 
in proving that the purpose of the statute has been triggered, 
i.e. the “state power” (the regime) is feeling threatened enough 
to press charges.  This is so for two reasons.  First, the Court 
has never failed to convict a defendant facing charges under 
the “National Security Laws,” especially the “Inciting Subver-
sion of State Power” statute.  Second, the Court almost always 
avoids adequate consideration of either the evidence or the de-
fendant’s arguments.    Needless to say, had the Court main-
tained some degree of independence from political influence, a 
72 See Statement of the Defendant, supra note 50 (“Each province in Chi-
na should break away from the central government; they should divide into 
27 nations, such as ‘the Republic of Anhui,’ ‘the Republic of Guangdong,’ and 
‘the Republic of Taiwan.’” (quoting Letter from Mao Zedong on Arguments 
Against Unification (Oct. 10, 1920); Mao Zedong, The Republic of Hunan-the 
Essential Problem in Hunan’s Development, TA KUNG PAO, Sept. 3, 1920)). 
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conviction under this vague and potentially unconstitutional 
statute could be quite difficult.  Unfortunately, with the Court 
faithfully siding with the prosecutors in these cases, the reality 
has proven to be the exact opposite. 
IV. THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD STRIKES BACK 
Through the Constitution’s design, the control over the ju-
diciary, and the newly crafted “National Security Laws,” the 
CCP appears to possess an arsenal of legal tools to effectively 
suppress political dissent and maintain stability.  This hard-
line approach to stability, however, is bound to put tremendous 
pressure on every level of government as well as the grieving, 
mistreated citizens, who are sharply increasing in number as a 
result of economic growth and the enlarging gap between rich 
and poor.   
A hard-line approach to dealing with political dissidents 
and public grievances as well as media censorship over the re-
porting of these events, often leads to a disguised sense of sta-
bility, while unresolved conflicts are merely temporarily sup-
pressed.  A peaceful career dissident like Mr. Liu, who lived in 
a labor camp, endured police surveillance ever since 1989, and 
now faces another eleven-year prison term, is a rarity in China 
as well as in any society.73
                                                 
73 Pen American Center, China: Liu Xiaobo,  http://www.pen.org/view-
media.php/prmMID/3029/prmID/172 (last visited Nov. 29, 2010). 
  The vast majority of the grievances 
against the Chinese Government today are each personal and 
issue-specific rather than a general call for political and legal 
reform.  Many of these issues have nothing to do with an ideol-
ogy nor challenge CCP leadership.  Yet, the strong emphasis on 
stability and maintaining a “harmonious society” requires the 
government, often the local governments, to perceive a wide-
spread grievance as a national security risk and suppress it at 
any cost.  Without any solid guidelines as to which rights are 
guaranteed by the Constitution other than the superseding di-
rective to create a harmonious society by, for example, always 
preventing public assembly, governments at different levels 
firmly hold a very inflexible attitude toward even the most 
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peaceful form of public dissent.  Such an inflexible approach 
has created bizarre consequences, such as the “protest zones” 
set up during the Beijing Olympics, for which all seventy-seven 
applications for lawful protest within the zones were denied.74  
The applicants, including a seventy-nine-year-old woman, were 
arrested and sentenced to reeducation labor camps for submit-
ting these “applications in accordance with the government’s 
own instructions.”75
In recent years “[t]he number of mass protests has risen 
rapidly, from 58,000 in 2003 to more than 74,000 in 2004 . . . . 
According to the state media, over 1,800 police were injured 
and 23 killed during protests in just the first nine months of 
2005.”
  Protesting without a license is considered 
illegal in China.  After this “protest zone” incident, it is clear 
that even following the proper, yet still arguably unconstitu-
tional, procedure of filing an application for protest is no differ-
ent than turning oneself in for a crime.  Under these circums-
tances, public grievances can easily turn violent.   
76  This number, of course, does not include the mass pro-
test in Tibet in 2008 and the violent unrest in Xinjiang, China 
in 2009, which has been the deadliest protest since 1989.  The 
widespread tension created as a result of land disputes and 
forced evictions has been a recurring episode in recent years.  
In July 2010, ten thousand residents in Suzhou “clashed with 
riot police” over a land dispute.77  As much as the censorship 
machine tries its best to prevent news of this kind from spread-
ing, it is undeniable that the goal of creating a “harmonious so-
ciety” has not been a successful one, especially when the term 
“harmonious society” has often become the source of satire in 
private life and cyberspace.78
                                                 
74 See Andrew Jacobs, Too Old and Frail to Re-Educate? Not In China, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2008, at A1, available at http:// www.ny-
times.com/2008/08/21/sports/olympics/21protest.html. 
 
75 RICHARD KOMAIKO & BEIBEI QUE, LAWYERS IN MODERN CHINA 1 (2009). 
76 Fu Yunlin & Randall Peerenboom, A New Analytical Framework for 
Understanding and Promoting Judicial Independence in China, in JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA 95, 109 (2010). 
77 Thousands in Five-Day China Demo: Report, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD 
(July 20, 2010), http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-world/thousands-in-
fiveday-china-demo-report-20100720-10i3b.html. 
78 See Evan Osnos, Decoding Chinese Humor, NEW YORKER BLOG (June 
17, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/evanosnos/2009/06/de-
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A most troubling signal is that the legal system, especially 
the judiciary, has played little part in reducing social unrest.  
While helping the Government put away dissidents for drafting 
articles or petitions as well as leaders of public protests for 
“disruption social order,” the courts have failed to offer an 
available remedy for grieving citizens, who feel wronged by the 
Government or a private party having significant ties to the 
Government.  In his article, Randall Peerenboom argued for 
the justification of limiting court access in some cases because 
“the courts lacked the resources, competence, and stature to 
provide effective relief … [and f]orcing the courts to handle 
such cases had undermined the authority of the judiciary and 
contributed to a sharp rise in petitions and mass protests.”79
                                                                                                             
coding-chinese-humor.html. 
  
Yet, this argument may have overlooked the causal link be-
tween many of the mass protests and the court’s role.  It is of-
ten not the case that the court lacks judicial competence, such 
as a relevant statute, to adjudicate many of the disputes.  In-
stead, in many cases, protests broke out after the court arbitra-
rily ruled in a certain way because of influence by the ruling 
party or individual officials.  In other cases, plaintiffs, who re-
sorted to violent protests, did not even use the judicial system 
knowing such an attempt would have been futile.  Making the 
courts an available, effective, and unbiased source for a remedy 
does not mean that all disputes will be heard by them because 
of limited resources.  However, when a remedy is not available 
from the judiciary or is virtually unattainable due to bias or 
corruption, any settlement out of court is easily subject to ma-
nipulation and corruption.  The aggrieved party in these set-
tlements is more, rather than less, likely to resort to protest or 
violence.  For example, despite the fact that new laws and 
regulations have been enacted due to rampant violence and, in 
some cases, public suicides in forced evictions, the local court in 
Wuxi, China announced the policy, off the record to all the liti-
gants, that it would dismiss any case relating to disputes of 
79 Randall Peerenboom, Judicial Independence in China: Common Myths 
and Unfounded Assumptions, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA 69, 79 
(2010). 
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this nature.  Disputes will not simply disappear when the court 
refuses to hear them.  They will, however, become the spark 
that ignites the fire of social unrest. 
V. CONCLUSION 
If there is any long-lasting truth throughout human histo-
ry, it is that people disagree with one another and this is not 
likely to end any time soon.  It is fair to say that there has nev-
er been a period in history, in any part of the world, where ab-
solute “harmony” or “stability” has been achieved.  Political 
dissent, or any dissent in general, is here to stay.  
China’s Constitution and the judiciary have traditionally 
been the faithful guardians of the political status quo.  After its 
emergence on the international stage, China has modernized 
its tools of political persecution.  These tools have proven effec-
tive in every individual case.  The Constitution has continued 
on its path of serving the CCP, the judiciary has continued on 
its path of faithfully maintaining the status quo, the amended 
Criminal Code has abandoned its obsession with ideology and 
become a pragmatic guardian of “state power.”  This swift 
hard-line approach to any sign that disrupts “harmony” is ef-
fective in crushing political dissidents, but it is also effective in 
creating new dissidents by putting non-politically motivated 
people into the general category of people who challenge “state 
power.”  This hard line approach puts all levels of government 
on constant alert and puts the judiciary in an indecisive posi-
tion where it has to constantly look to the CCP for direction.  
Decades ago, the CCP’s confidence level depended on its ideo-
logical propaganda, and its open stance against the political of-
fenders.  Today, this level has dropped to covert trials and an 
increasing degree of censorship, not for the sake of a powerful 
ideology any more, but mainly for silencing the voices that may 
shake its only means of survival - economic growth, which has 
greatly benefited its interest groups. 
If there is another long-lasting truth throughout human 
history, it is probably that there is no such thing as a perpe-
tually growing economic index.  When a society’s means for re-
leasing social tension, such as an independent judiciary and 
the right to free speech and protest, are taken away, the socie-
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ty’s “stability” becomes a zero-sum game.  Without any means 
for peaceful and constructive political dissent, violent social 
strife is a likely result.  Social tensions have erupted in tens of 
thousands of violent clashes each year as well as the five recent 
incidents of school children stabbing cases.80
 
  To prevent the 
current regime from following the fate of the old dynasties, 
perhaps some form of “noise” must be tolerated in this “harmo-
nious society.” 
                                                 
80 See Edward Wong, Fifth Deadly Attack on a School Haunts China, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.ny-
times.com/2010/05/13/world/asia/13china.html?scp=1&sq=china%20school%2
0children%20kindergarten&st=cse. 
